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Abstract Th e paper gives an analysis of the process as a result of which postcommunist 
Romania has moved from being an offi  cially atheist country to being one of the most religious 
countries in Europe. Th e process of desecularisation is analysed in three dimensions. On the 
macro-level, I outline the religious headway in the most important institutions of the Romanian 
society, on the meso-level I analyse the changes in the organizational structure of churches and 
in the denominational structure of the country, while on the individual level the changes occur-
ring in individual religiosity. In the fi nal part of the study I argue that within these dimensions 
desecularisation was realized to diff erent extents, while “desecularisation from above” is not 
likely to achieve its goals in the long run.
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Presently, Romania is one of the most religious countries in Europe (Voicu 2007, Tomka 
2005). However, this situation is relatively new, as twenty three years ago Romania was offi  cially 
an atheist country, in which religion – at least offi  cially – was considered the anachronistic, 
tolerated relic of the past. And although in reality the population of the country was probably 
quite religious back then as well, the social importance of religion was signifi cantly lower than 
today – thus this leading position of the country at the beginning of the 21st century is the result 
of developments of the past 20 years. In my paper I attempt to review these developments by 
analysing the events that led to the present-day situation.
Th e expansion of religion in Romania is not an isolated case, as from the 1990s onwards 
several comprehensive studies report a religious revival as well as the rise in the social signifi cance 
of religion (Casanova 1994, Berger 1998a). Based on Berger, the concept of desecularization 
is accepted to name the phenomenon, which should be understood as counter-secularisation, 
that is the expansion of religion in societies previously characterized by secularizing tendencies 
(Berger 1998b). In his detailed explanation of the concept, Karpov (2010) defi nes desecularisa-
tion as the opposite process of secularisation, and uses the same dimensions in outlining it as the 
ones applied by the theoreticians of secularization. Th us, one of the areas of desecularisation is 
represented by previously secularized institutions, in which religious norms gain new ground, 
both in the formal and informal sense. Th e process of desecularisation can be realised in the 
practice of religion and religious faith, leading to the revival and intensifi cation of religious life, 
but also through the fact that religious practice moves from the private sphere to the public one 
in a more accentuated way. Desecularisation can also manifest itself in the character of cultural 
products (art, literature, philosophy, etc.), the contents of which have become more religious, 
and last but not least in the “substratum” of society, that is in its material culture (e.g., in the 
building of churches and parochial buildings, in the growth of the economic wealth of the 
churches, in the appearance of religious market products, etc.). Th ese diff erent areas of social 
life can become desecularised more or less independently from one another, and thus we can 
encounter very diff erent cases of desecularisation in real life (Karpov 2010. 250). Th e areas in 
which desecularisation processes take place are mostly determined by the social actors they are 
the result of: while the simple religious actors achieve outcomes mostly in the fi eld of religious 
practice and faith (“desecularisation from below”), the activist groups with greater social infl u-
ence are capable of de-secularising the system of institutions and culture in the above sense as 
well (“desecularisation from above”) (Karpov 2010. 251–255).
While I agree completely with the above outlined concept of desecularisation, in my analy-
sis – which is not based on my own empirical research, but aims to be a synthesis of available 
empirical analyses – its application is diffi  cult as it includes many dimensions that have not yet 
been investigated in Romania. Th us, preserving the logic of Karpov’s conceptualisation, the de-
secularisation processes which have taken place in Romania are discussed below using the three 
dimensions of secularisation defi ned by Dobellaere. Dobellaere, in systematising the voluminous 
scholarly literature on secularisation, determines three “levels” of the phenomenon (Dobellaere 
2002). According to him, secularisation means a diminishing commitment of the individuals 
towards the church, which he calls “individual secularisation”. Th is therefore covers the increas-
ing diff erence between the actual religious knowledge, attitudes and everyday behaviour of the 
believers and the expectations of the church related to these. Th e second level of secularization 
is institutional secularisation, which means the internal, organisational restructuration of the 
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churches and denominations, including the changes in the message and in the values represented 
by the organizations. As a third level of secularisation he identifi es societal secularisation. Th is 
is the result of the functional diff erentiation of modern societies, and covers the phenomenon in 
which, due to gradual professionalization, certain sectors (sub-systems) of modern societies gain 
more and more autonomy, becoming independent in this process from religion. As a result of 
this level of secularisation, religion becomes an independent social sub-system, which in addition 
is being gradually transferred from the public sphere to the private sphere (Dobellaere 2002. 
29–40). Th e cause of the diff erentiation of the sub-systems is rationalisation, as a result of which 
the actors of the sub-systems are regulated by instrumental control rather than moral control.
In the light of Dobellaere’s theory, in the following I consider the changes that have occurred 
in Romania in the relationship between religion and the main institutions of society, that is in 
the societal position of religion, as well as the processes on the level of religious organisations, 
and the way in which individual religiosity has been transformed.
Religious change at the societal level
One of the most common explanations of the change occurring in the societal status of 
religion in social modernisation is linked to the theory of social diff erentiation, according to 
which the sub-systems specialising in performing certain social tasks and “functions” become 
more and more self-reliant and more independent from other sub-systems, they start following 
their own instrumental rationality and take the more general moral considerations less into ac-
count (Pokol 1997). Th e independence of the individual sub-systems from religion can occur 
as an unexpected consequence of professionalization (latent societal secularisation), but also as 
the conscious eff ort for the laicisation of the given social sphere (manifest societal secularisa-
tion) (Dobellaere 2002). As it is known, in Eastern Europe the latter type of secularisation 
was dominant, and the reduction of the infl uence of the churches and religion over certain sub-
systems occurred as the result of violent intervention on the behalf of the state. Such secularising 
intervention was for example the nationalisation of religious education, of the religious health 
and social institutions, or the banning of the economic activities of churches by confi scating 
their property. Th is aspect of the socialist transformation of society was not legitimate in the 
eyes of large groups of the population, thus the political motivation of societal secularisation 
between 1945 and 1989 was one of the reasons and prerequisites of the opposite, desecularisation 
processes aft er the regime change. As the result of the latter, religion and the churches have been 
re-gaining infl uence over the previously secularised institutions of society, and their infl uence 
seems to be growing steadily. Th e presence of the church in such institutions is oft en merely 
symbolic, which in itself is not a negligible phenomenon; however sometimes the intertwining 
of the religious and other sub-systems exceeds the symbolic level and religion comes to aff ect 
the functioning of the sub-system (Moise 2004; Andreescu, G.–Andreescu, L. 2009). 
Th e process of desecularisation in question is perhaps the most spectacular in the case of 
the political sub-system. From the point of view of this relationship it is crucial, that orthodox 
theology mutually defi nes the Romanian nation and the church by each other, and that – ac-
cordingly – any attempt to separate the church and the state is interpreted as an attack against 
the church (Stnescu 1996). Its relations with any kind of political power are viewed by the 
Romanian Orthodox Church in the light of the “Byzantine Symphony”, according to which the 
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proper arrangement is the close co-operation between the two. Even in the communist decades, 
this co-operation worked better than in the majority of socialist countries, as a result of which 
the suppression of denominations in Romania was less powerful than in the other countries 
of the communist bloc. Th e desecularisation of the political system aft er the regime change is 
especially striking on the symbolic level, as the presence of the leaders of the Orthodox Church 
sanctifi es almost every political event. In addition to this symbolic presence, the church and state 
structures are intertwined in their institutions as well, through the State Secretariat for Religious 
Aff airs. Th is institution, although part of the state apparatus, is virtually the representative of 
the Orthodox Church in the state apparatus by the fact that the ones occupying offi  ce positions 
are almost without exception church people with a degree in theology, and who try to enforce 
the interests of the Church rather than those of the state in their offi  ce. 
In addition to the symbolic and institutional intertwining, the Orthodox Church also in-
fl uences the functioning of the political sub-system. Th is is achieved on the one hand through 
the close relationship between the Orthodox Church and ethnic identity, as in every political 
decision with an ethnic dimension the infl uence of the Orthodox Church as an ethnic church 
is obvious. In addition to their role in the formation of ethnic politics, in the last twenty years 
denominations have frequently played a role in shaping public opinion in political issues not 
related to ethnicity as well. In this respect the role which can be considered even more impor-
tant than infl uencing the voters’ choice options, which the Orthodox Church gained through 
the development of policies and infl uence, is that in the public debates it has become the most 
important social partner at the expense of the institutions of civil society.
Th e process of desecularisation is similarly spectacular in the case of educational institu-
tions. Th e symbolic presence is strong in this case as well, as the events at the beginning and end of 
school years are rarely without ecclesiastic presence, religious symbols on the walls of educational 
institutions are oft en found – one of the public debates in the topic has been provoked exactly by 
the issue of icons (sacred images) in schools (Bakó–Horváth 2009). Establishing school chapels 
and college churches is no longer of a merely symbolic signifi cance, as there is real religious 
activity going on in them, and as such they are the bastions of church(es) in the educational 
system. Th e most important interlocking of religious and educational institutions however has 
not been achieved by these, but by the introduction of religious instruction in schools, as the 
result of which church representatives with a degree in theology have become a constant presence 
in public schools. Th is presence infl uences the specifi c rationality of education, regarding the 
pedagogical principles on the one hand, and the principles of cognition on the other. Pedagogy 
is an independent science, with particular notions regarding education and training, as well as 
particular methods developed for these, from which the principles and methods of the churches 
may be more or less diff erent (Moise 2004).1 In addition to these particular pedagogical issues, 
the presence of the church infl uences the functioning of the school in the way that it spreads a 
world view and cognitive logic diff erent from the scientifi c world view and the rational cogni-
tive principles behind it that are propagated by education. Th is eff ort is well represented by the 
attempt to exclude the theory of evolution from the biology curriculum, as well as that of the 
philosophical concepts of God from the philosophy curriculum.2 In these cases the autonomy 
 1  Th e diff erences between the pedagogical principles are well presented in an educational story written by 
Moise: in the story from the Orthodox religion textbook the little boy tries to destroy a swallow’s nest, but due 
to God’s intervention the ladder falls, and the little boy lies in bed all summer as punishment (Moise 2004).
 2 A comprehensive overview of this attempt to infl uence the curriculum can be found in the open letter ad-
dressed to the Ministry of National Education by the Solidarity for the freedom of conscience organisation. 
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and independence of these scientifi c fi elds are damaged as a result of the intervention of the 
religious sub-system. Besides the attempts to infl uence the contents of the curriculum, there is 
a similar infl uence upon the actually taught material as – especially in rural schools – due to 
administrative reasons the teachers of religion with a theological qualifi cation are forced to teach 
other subjects as well (Moise 2004, Stan–Turcescu 2005, Andreescu et.al. 2007).
In addition to politics and education, a strong presence of the church has been established 
in the social and health care sector. In these the situation is similar to the above, except for the 
fact that the impact on the functioning of these institutions is presumably weaker, than in the 
case of political or educational institutions. Th e infl uence of the church upon the economic 
sphere seems also to be minor.
In the above we have mainly discussed the transformations of the relations between the 
Romanian Orthodox Church and the institutions of the state, as the societal status of religion 
is determined fi rst and foremost by the religion of the Romanian majority. Th e situation of 
the Hungarian minority denominations is also worth an analysis. Taking into account the not 
purely religious social engagements of the Hungarian historical churches, it becomes obvious 
that – unlike the Orthodox Church – these primarily take place within the framework of civil 
society. Th is is consistent with the Western European models, where the emergence of religion 
from the private sphere (de-privatisation) and the strengthening of its social presence (revitali-
sation) also happen within the frameworks of civil society. By its presence in civil society, the 
public appearance of religion is realised without infl uencing the systemic operation of these 
societies (Casanova 1994).
With regard to the societal expansion of religion and churches, the question of the social 
legitimacy of the phenomenon can also be raised. In a nationally representative survey conducted 
in 2008 we formulated questions about the public perception of the political infl uence of priests. 
Th e answers revealed that the majority of the population does not agree with the infl uence of the 
church upon politics: infl uencing the opinions of the voters was rejected by 80% of the respond-
ents, while 73.5% does not agree with the infl uencing of political decisions. We have not found 
any signifi cant diff erences in these opinions of the diff erent ethnical groups.3












Priests should not infl uence
 the way people vote 50.1. 28.9 9.3 5.4 6.2
Priests should not infl uence
 political decisions 48.9 24.6 12.1 7.7 6.7
http://www.humanism.ro/articles.php?page=62&article=225
 3  Th e data are from the “Social cohesion and inter-ethnic climate in Romania 2008” research, which was car-
ried out by the Interethnic Relationships Research Centre in October-November of 2008 for the Romanian 
Institute for Research on National Minorities.
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Changes in the organisation of the church, modifi cations in the denominational 
structures and the nature of religiosity
I fi nd particularly remarkable two aspects of the manifold processes of transformation in 
the mid-level of the Romanian religious context: the organisational growth of the large churches 
and the changes in the religious patterns within these.
From the point of view of organisational changes the large churches have gone through a 
process of obvious growth. Th e end of the bans formulated by the communist regime was fi rst 
followed by an increase in the number of the clergy, and together with the introduction of religious 
instruction in public schools a new body of individuals with a theological degree appeared, that of 
the teachers of religion. Th eir number reaches in order of magnitude that of priests, as according 
to the 2011 statistics of the Orthodox Church, in addition to the latter group of 14,231, the group 
of around 7,700 of the teachers of religion is active in education. 4 Th e growth of the clergy and 
that of the training of teachers of religion both have contributed to the growth of a third group 
of religious experts, that of teachers of theology. Th e expansion of the latter group was further 
strengthened by pairing theology with other university courses, as a result of which theological 
training became available in a much larger circle. Th e integration of theological education in 
state universities – which means that the fi nancial burden of the cost of the training does not 
need to be borne by the churches – resulted in the facilitation of the rise in the number of both 
the students and the teachers. Th us the number of institutions providing theological education 
increased from three to fi ft een in the fi rst ten years aft er the regime change, and the number of 
the enrolled students exceeds ten thousand (Andreescu–Kacsó 2009). And fi nally there is a 
signifi cant rise in the number of groups of monks, whose massive presence mainly characterizes 
the Orthodox Church: according to the aforementioned statistics in 2011 there were 8476 monks 
living in the country. Overall the number of people with a theological qualifi cation has multi-
plied in the last twenty years. Th is organisational and personnel growth mainly characterises 
the Orthodox Church; however similar processes took place in the case of the other churches as 
well. Th e smallest increase occurred in churches with less signifi cant resources for growth: the 
ones, which – due to the fact that they have less members and to their geographical dispersion 
– were not entitled to start groups within the system of religious education in schools, and in 
which there are no religious orders functioning.
In addition to the institutional growth within the church, another organisational change is 
the institutionalisation of church movements. Two types of such movements should be distin-
guished, the ones organised around visions, and the reform movements created with the purpose 
of changing the churches from within. Movements built around visions mainly characterise the 
Orthodox Church,5 however we have knowledge of similar events in the Hungarian population 
of the country, the most important of them being the one organised around the Seuca visions 
 4 Th ese data refer only to Orthodox priest and teachiers of religion. Th e source of the Romanian Orthodox Church 
Staff  statistics: http://www.patriarhia.ro/_layouts/images/File/ADM_2011.pdf (accessed: 2014.02.05) Th e 
numbers of teachers of religion is mentioned in the following: http://www.noutati-ortodoxe.ro/b-raspunsul-
patriarhiei-romane-la-ultimele-dezinformari-asur-b_l24744_p0.html (acessed: 2014.12.15)
 5 In his textbook “Misiologie şi ecumensim” [‘Missiology and Ecumenism’] David Pestroiu presents several 
movements organized around visions: Noul Ierusalim, Petrache Lupu de la Maglavit, Miscarea de la Vladi-
miresti (Pestroiu, 2010)
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(Peti 2009). Th e common characteristic of these movements is that they are popular among 
the members of lower classes, and institutionalised movements are rarely developed from them. 
Churches treat them with reservation; any type of institutionalisation usually leads to excom-
munication and exclusion. Th e reform or revival movements are created with the purpose to 
renew worship and moral order within the church. Th ese movements therefore signal the need 
for internal change, while their constant presence in the church may trigger the transformation 
of the dominant forms of piety. Th ey are more organised than the ones built around visions, 
and thus their exclusion is more diffi  cult, especially when members of the clergy are involved in 
them. Table 2 lists the most important reform movements of the three largest historical churches, 
without being exhaustive.
Table  v Th e renewal movements of the three largest churches in Romania
Romanian Orthodox Church Roman Catholic Church Reformed Church
Oastea Domnului [‘Army of the Lord’]
Miscarea Rugul Aprins 
[‘Th e Burning Bush Movement’]
Miscarea Ortodoxa de Reinviere 




Hit és fény [‘Faith and Light’]
Karizmatikus Megújulás 
[‘Charismatic Movement’]
Ferences Világi Rend [‘Secular 
Franciscan Order’]
CE Szövetség [‘CE Association’]
Zimányi – mozgalom [‘Zimányi – 
movement’]
Miskolci Missziós Csoport [‘Mis-
kolc Missionary Group’]
A part of these movements were established as far back as the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury. Before communism, most of them were considered sects to be excluded by their churches, 
and the communist regime did not tolerate them because of their self-organised, civil nature. 
In order to eradicate them, secular power oft en used the help of priests working for the secret 
police as well, and as a result these movements survived until the regime change as underground 
movements, in confl ict with their own churches. Aft er the regime change the most important 
ones were reconciled with, and a more or less formal integration was achieved as well (Kiss 
2003; Blaga 2009).
Th e analyses on the most popular reform movements of the three largest churches, the 
Oastea Domnului [‘Th e Army of the Lord’], the Catholic Charismatic Movement and the CE 
Association, have pointed out several common characteristics within these. All three movements 
are organised as integrated systems of small groups, as multi-centre horizontal networks consist-
ing of local small communities. Regarding their teaching – compared to their churches – they 
are characterised by a greater ethical rigour on the one hand, on the other the members play 
a more active role in the shaping of individual religious world views than what is usual in the 
large churches; nevertheless this happens with a frequent emphasizing of doctrinal unity with 
the church. From the point of view of religious practices the importance of personal repentance, 
the evangelization ambitions, the high emotional loads of community events, the high impor-
tance of music and song, as well as the relative laxity of physical discipline can be highlighted. 
As there is no common root of these movements, the similarities in the movements operating 
within the framework of the diff erent churches probably indicate a more general shift  in religious 
needs, regardless of denomination. Such common features are the practice of religion in small 
communities, the religious egalitarianism within these small communities, the high degree of 
individual freedom and spontaneity in the experiencing of religion, as well as the appreciation 
of emotions. Th e unusual success of the Pentecostal Church featuring many of the above also 
supports our interpretation, as the membership of this church has increased by 64 percent in 
the period following the regime change (from 220,000 to 362,000).
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Apart from the spectacular growth of the Pentecostal Church, the denominational structure 
of the country aft er the regime change is characterised by a high degree of stability, the smaller 
changes are partly explained by the fact that many Hungarians have emigrated (the decrease in 
the percentage of Roman Catholics, Reformed and Unitarians) or by the aging membership (the 
decrease in the percentage of the Israelites). Concerning the changes in the membership of the 
diff erent denominations, the slowing growth of evangelical churches is conspicuous, especially 
in the past ten years, as well as the minimal success of the newer “sects” and new religious move-
ments: the category of “other denominations” increased from 0.4 percent to only 0.6 percent in 
twenty years. Knowing that half of this, 49,820 people belong to Jehovah’s Witnesses, 15,514 to 
the Romanian Lutheran Church, and 14,385 to the Serbian Orthodox Church, the remaining 
“other denominations” make up only 0.2 percent of the denominational structure.6 Although 
the exact composition of this is not known, according to our knowledge it is largely made up of 
evangelical communities, while the presence of new religious movements that have made a great 
stir in the Western countries in the past 50 years seems insignifi cant. However, it is essential 
to mention in relation to the latter that most of them do not expect an exclusive membership 
from their followers, that is they do not expect them to give up their previous religious affi  lia-
tions, and the options to connect off ered are not the usual (for example they off er participation 
at courses rather than membership), so the number of followers is almost impossible to grasp 
from the statistical point of view.
Table  v Romania’s denominational structure according to census data, as well as the changes in the 
membership of the denominations between 1992 and 2011.
1992 2002 2011 Change between 1992 and 2011 (%)
Eastern Orthodox 86.8 86.8 86.5 -17.7
Roman Catholic 5.1 4.7 4.6 -25.1
Greek-Catholic 1.0 0.9 0.8 -32.6
Reformed 3.5 3.2 3.2 -25.1
Pentecostal 1.0 1.5 1.9 64.1
Baptist 0.5 0.6 0.6 3.1
Seventh-day Adventist 0.3 0.4 0.4 4.4
Unitarian 0.3 0.3 0.3 -24.8
Muslim 0.2 0.3 0.3 15.0
Evangelical Christian 0.2 0.2 0.2 -14.9
Old Believers or Old Rite Christians 0.1 0.2 0.2 15.7
Lutheran Synod Presbyterian 0.1 0.1 0.1 -5.0
Lutheran (Augsburg Confession) 0.2 0.1 0.0 -86.2
Israelite 0.0 0.0 0.0 -63.6
Other denomination 0.4 0.5 0.6 25.0
Non-religious and atheist 0.2 0.1 0.2 14.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 -
 6 All the numerical data regarding the denominations are based on census data. Source: http://www.recensa-
mantromania.ro/ 
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Changes in individual religiosity
Besides the changes outlined above regarding the social presence of churches and their 
systemic roles, there has been an increase in religiosity in the individual aspects as well. Despite 
all their shortcomings, the most frequently and periodically repeated surveys used to measure 
personal religiosity allow the tracking of the intensity of religiosity over time. To this end, they 
diff erentiate several dimensions of religiosity, for example the practical aspect of religion consist-
ing of actions, the (cognitive) dimension of faiths and knowledge, the dimension of experience 
and the organisational dimension. In the period following the regime change an increase can 
be detected in all of these. Th e following fi gure shows several indicators of the cognitive, practi-
cal and organisational dimensions of religiosity in three diff erent points in time: in 1993, 1999, 
and 2008. Th ere has been an increase in every one of these indicators. Th e increase was more 
signifi cant between 1993 and 1999, followed by stagnation: between 1999 and 2008 the values 
remain roughly the same.
Th e international comparative studies draw attention to several other additional explanatory 
factors of this high degree of religiosity. Th ese show that in Europe the economic situation of the 
countries, the level of education, as well as religious pluralism determine the level of religiosity: 
the richer the country, the more it is characterized by religious plurality, the higher the level of 
education of the people, the less religious the population of that particular country is. In the case 
of Romania all three indicators determine a higher degree of religiosity (Voicu 2007).
Th us Romania, as the result of a complex process, has become one of the most religious 
countries in Europe, but the question is how long this religious fl are is going to exist. On the dif-
ferent levels of the analysis regarding the expected changes in the societal signifi cance of religion 
contradictory predictions can be made. On the level of individual religiosity the explanations 
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used by international comparative studies predict a temporary nature to the religious fl are, as 
a possible economic boost and the expected growth in the education of the population will in-
duce a decrease in religiosity in the light of these. A similar eff ect on personal religiosity is to be 
expected from the slow increase in religious plurality, which is also facilitated by international 
mass migration, which makes facing religious otherness inevitable even if the background of 
the migrants does not become pluralised from the religious point of view. Based on the systemic 
and organisational changes presented in the fi rst part of our analysis however, in these scenes 
of religious revival the persistence of religion is more likely, as the increased systemic presence 
of the churches and their position of power can hardly be reduced. For the manifold multiplied 
group of religious experts it is also an existential necessity to preserve the current position of 
power, and knowing that we are talking about probably the most eff ective opinion-forming 
group, it is not likely that there will be any attempt on behalf of the political class to limit the 
political power and infl uence of these groups.
It is possible that in the future in Romania, besides a highly de-secularised system of insti-
tutions and the presence of an enlarged group of religious experts, the slow decline of personal 
religiosity can be expected. Th is can be inferred not only from the above described system of 
interconnections between welfare, education, religious plurality and religiosity, but also from 
the fact that the religiosity of the growing generation seems not to be greatly infl uenced by the 
now stronger religious socialization through religious instruction in schools. As shown in Figure 
3 above, the religiosity of the successive generations presents a continuous decrease regarding 
most indicators, and this linear decrease is not broken by the fact that the generation born aft er 
1981 received full religious instruction in schools. Th ese data thus indicate that in spite of the 
systemic spread of churches, in the case of individual religiosity the continuation of the trend 
of secularisation is to be expected in the long run. ❋
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